Abstract. The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen's 'Modal Fictionalism'.
that there could have been zombies -people who share our physical properties but lack phenomenal consciousness. I will want to say Z There is a world at which there are zombies.
But since there are no zombies in this world (let me assume), Z looks as though it implies the existence of a merely possible world.
Modal realists are happy to believe that there are merely possible worlds as well as the actual world. I'll call the proposition that they believe 'Plurality'. Belief in Plurality is distinctive of modal realism. It seems that if I believe Z to be true, I have to commit myself to Plurality. However, many philosophers are unwilling to believe Plurality. Even David Lewis, the staunchest defender of a version of Plurality, admitted that his view clashes violently with our pre-theoretical beliefs about what exists (Lewis 1986: 133) . 1 So there is an apparent tension between engaging in possible-worlds talk and refusing to assert Plurality. We are caught in a dilemma: we must either assert Plurality or stop taking part in possible-worlds discourse.
3. Gideon Rosen begins his 1990 by outlining just this tension. He goes on to discuss the prospects for a way of resolving it, called modal fictionalism. This doctrine hinges on the use of a 'story prefix': according to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds (or Acc to PW for short),
where the hypothesis in question is David Lewis's modal realism. The crucial thing about this prefix is that it is non-factive: that something is true according to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds does not entail that it is true. For instance, it may well be true that, although Z is false, the sentence Z+ According to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, there is a world at which there are zombies.
is true.
One benefit gained by those who engage in possible worlds talk is that they can provide a semantics for sentences of English which include the modal expressions 'necessarily', (Rosen 1990: 330) . But how can modal fictionalism deliver this without giving an account of possible-worlds discourse?
There are two obvious strategies for resolving the initial dilemma. One is to maintain that sentences like Z are free of commitment to merely possible worlds: whilst they may appear to entail Plurality, they do not genuinely do so. If this is the case, then we may endorse them freely with no immediate threat of commitment to Plurality. The other strategy maintains that sentences like Z do indeed entail Plurality, so that anyone who endorses them must believe Plurality to be true; but that it is permissible to go on uttering these sentences without believing them.
Rosen says several things that suggest the first of these strategies. (In §6, I will explore a reading of Rosen which sees him as taking the second strategy.) For instance, he introduces a character called Ed, who is feeling the force of the dilemma. Rosen writes:
[A] theorist who rejects ersatzism ... but at the same time finds the realist's metaphysical picture impossible to accept ... has good reason to look into Ed's remaining option -to interpret his apparent quantification over possible worlds as an innocent façon de parler, involving no commitment to possible worlds of any sort. (Rosen 1990: 329-330) Rosen labels this approach 'deflationist', and he goes on to explain modal fictionalism. (Rosen 1993a: 71) This suggests that the definition of modal fictionalism given above is inadequate: we should supplement it with an interpretation of possible-worlds sentences as they are used by
fictionalists. This interpretation is given by all instances of the following schema: Gideon Rosen puts forward an account of modal discourse which suggests how one can translate such discourse into possible worlds discourse without any untoward ontological commitments. … [Rosen's] suggestion is the following. Let P be any modal sentence and P L its translation into Lewisian counterpart theory. Then, Rosen suggests, the correct translation of P into possible world discourse is not P L but rather 'According to the Lewisian hypothesis of a plurality of worlds, P L '…. (Noonan 1994: 133) There is no mention here of possible-worlds sentences or how Rosen proposes to treat them.
The same deficiency can be found in the expositions of modal fictionalism offered in Nolan and O'Leary Hawthorne 1996 , Baldwin 1998 , Chihara 1998 , Kim 2002 , and Dever 2003 . And even philosophers who mention that modal fictionalism offers an interpretation of possible-worlds discourse then go on to ignore this aspect of the view, treating modal fictionalism as though it were confined to MF (thus, for example, Brock 1993).
I have argued that we must take this neglected aspect of modal fictionalism seriously if we are to resolve the tension concerning possible-worlds discourse which motivated the position in the first place. I will now argue that if we do so, we will find that fictionalism can repel one of the most troublesome objections that has been launched at it: namely, the Brock-Rosen objection.
5. Rosen does not endorse the modal fictionalism he put forward (see Chihara 1998: 169) -indeed, he was one of its earliest critics. Rosen (1993a) and Stuart Brock (1993) independently hit upon an objection to modal fictionalism which purports to show that the modal fictionalist is committed to Plurality after all.
The objection can be stated as follows. Modal fictionalists must believe that the following argument is sound:
( 
There is a plurality of worlds. (4 standard modal logic)
But if modal fictionalists believe that this is sound, then they must endorse its conclusion. And so they are forced to take on belief in a plurality of words -exactly what modal fictionalism was intended to avoid. This objection fails. According to RM fictionalism, the conclusion of the argument expresses a truth, but one which is perfectly compatible with the denial of Plurality. It is natural to think that the proposition expressed by 'Acc to PW, there is a world at which there are blue swans' is both true and ontologically innocent. RM fictionalists contend that, in their mouths, the sentence 'There is a world at which there are blue swans' expresses this proposition -rather than (as we might have expected) a controversial ontological proposition entailing Plurality.
RM fictionalists can respond to the Brock-Rosen objection in just the same way. They should (i) concede the soundness of the argument mentioned in the statement of the objection, and thus (ii) concede that the conclusion of the argument ('There is a plurality of worlds') expresses a truth; but at the same time (iii) deny that this truth entails Plurality. For RM fictionalists, 'There is a plurality of worlds' expresses the proposition that is more transparently expressed by the sentence 'Acc to PW, at all worlds, there is a plurality of worlds'.
(So MF2 says.) RM fictionalists should claim that this proposition can obtain even if there are no merely possible worlds. This is a highly plausible claim to make: surely Lewis's theory can incorporate Plurality whether or not Plurality is true.
Simplicity aside, what merits does this response to the Brock-Rosen objection have? Its principal advantage is that it treats the Brock-Rosen objection in the same way as the blue swan argument, which seems desirable. Given that RM fictionalism has the resources to resist the blue swan objection, and that these can be deployed to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection too, it seems ad hoc to counter Brock-Rosen in any other way. There is no need to resort to tinkering with the details of how modal claims are to be interpreted, as Noonan does. The new response to Brock-Rosen is the natural one to make. about possible worlds. But, as we have seen, he characterises modal fictionalism as a version of deflationism. So this passage is evidence for the view that Rosen intended modal fictionalists to take the second way round the dilemma, rather than providing an interpretation of possible worlds talk that reveals that none of these sentences entails Plurality. On this view, Z entails Plurality, but modal fictionalists can utter it without having to believe Plurality provided they do not assert it. They can utter it to express a different belief -the belief that, according to the plurality of worlds hypothesis, there is a world at which there are zombies.
Let us call this version of modal fictionalism 'pragmatic modal fictionalism', or 'PM fictionalism' for short. I will not consider the question of whether Rosen meant to put forward RM fictionalism or PM fictionalism. Instead, I will now argue that the Brock-Rosen objection presents no threat to PM fictionalism, because PM fictionalists are not committed to (1) .
A PM fictionalist who utters Z in the context of a philosophical debate (say, about the philosophy of mind) does not believe the proposition which she thinks it expresses. For she is aware that if she believed this proposition, she would be committed to believing Plurality.
Rather, she believes the proposition expressed by the paraphrase Z+ ('According to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, there is a world at which there are zombies'). This is a proposition about Lewis's theory, and, as such, is innocent of commitment to Plurality.
The following is an instance of MF:
There is a world at which there are zombies iff according to the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds, there is a world at which there are zombies.
It is part of PM fictionalism to refrain from asserting this biconditional. PM fictionalists are happy to assert the right-hand side, which is just Z+. But if they asserted the biconditional, then they would also have to assert the left-hand side, which is Z -and it is part of PM fictionalism not to assert Z, or any kindred possible-worlds sentences.
As I have explained matters, fictionalists refuse to assert Plurality because they do not believe it. There is a stronger position in the vicinity: that of believing and asserting the negation of Plurality. PM fictionalists who adopt this stronger position will explicitly deny Z, on the grounds that it entails a falsehood, namely, Plurality. These philosophers will not only refrain from asserting (*) but actually assert that it is false, on the grounds that the left-hand side is false but the right-hand side is true. In any case, every PM fictionalist will refuse to assert (*). Exactly the same goes for other instances of MF where the left-hand side is a non-modal possible-worlds sentence.
Premiss (1) of the argument mentioned in the statement of the Brock-Rosen objection is an instance of MF. Since the left-hand side of (1) contains the modal expression 'Necessarily', this side of the biconditional is a modal possible-worlds sentence, unlike the left-hand side of (*). This raises the question: quite generally, how should PM fictionalists treat instances of MF whose left-hand side is a modal possible-worlds sentence?
As I have said, possible-worlds sentences are useful for clarifying our modal claims.
But it is not clear that we need to use modal possible-worlds sentences to achieve this end. The purpose of possible-worlds discourse is to provide a way of stating modal claims with greater clarity than ordinary modal talk can provide. Until evidence is provided to the contrary, PM fictionalists may assume that we only need to use non-modal possible-worlds sentences to articulate modal claims. There is no need to adulterate possible-worlds talk with ordinary modal locutions such as 'Necessarily'. It seems that we can resolve the initial dilemma by giving an account of non-modal possible-worlds talk alone.
This means that PM fictionalists have two options for dealing with instances of MF that have modal possible-worlds sentences on the left-hand side. The lazier option is to say nothing about the interpretation of these sentences. That is a perfectly defensible move, since the resolution of the initial dilemma does not require the theorist to say anything about these sentences; as we have seen, it is the non-modal possible-worlds sentences -the ones we need to use to talk clearly about modal matters -whose use stands in need of justification.
The more energetic option is to treat (1) in the same way as Z, by refusing to assert it.
Again, there are two ways to go: either refuse to assert the left-hand side, but assert the right-hand side, or, more boldly, deny the left-hand side, assert the right, and thus deny the whole biconditional. There is no need for PM fictionalists to take this more energetic course, but they are free do so do. Whether they choose the lazy or the energetic option, they are not committed to endorsing (1) , so the Brock-Rosen objection cannot get off the ground. Modal fictionalists must believe that the following argument is sound:
There is not a plurality of worlds.
Possibly, there is not a plurality of worlds. (Standard modal logic)
Possibly, there is not a plurality of worlds iff Acc to PW, there is a world at which there is not a plurality of worlds. (Instance of MF)
Acc to PW, there is a world at which there is not a plurality of worlds. (Modus ponens) But the conclusion of this argument is false: the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds says that, at every world, there is a plurality of worlds. So the fictionalist is committed to a falsehood.
Relying as it does on MF, rather than MF2, this should be classed as a new objection to modal fictionalism: strictly speaking, it is not an objection to RM fictionalism as such or to the response to Brock-Rosen I have advised RM fictionalists to make. All the same, it would be unsatisfying if the adoption of RM fictionalism or of my suggested response to Brock-Rosen were to prevent modal fictionalists from dealing with it. I think this is not the case: the modal fictionalist who adopts RM fictionalism and replies to Brock-Rosen in the way laid out in the text has two ways of responding to the objection. These responses are also open to modal fictionalists more generally.
One way is to refuse to assert the first premiss of the argument. As I have characterised them, fictionalists are philosophers who are unwilling to believe Plurality. I did not burden fictionalists with a commitment to denying it: instead, they are free to sit on the fence, neither denying nor asserting that there is a plurality of worlds. Compare Some fictionalists, though, will want to assert that there are no such things as worlds;
these fictionalists need a different response to the objection. They can do so by noting that modal realists have trouble in adequately translating modal claims about worlds into worlds-talk that is free of modal locutions like 'Necessarily' and 'Possibly'. Following hints in Lewis, Divers (1999b) has suggested that that realists should respond to these problems by translating modal claims about worlds (and certain other modal claims) according to the following schemata:
Modal fictionalists can take another leaf out of the modal realist's book by adopting these ways of translating modal claims about worlds. In other words, they can accept all instances of P and N, where p is any possible-worlds sentence -continuing to translate all other modal claims according to MF.
This manoeuvre defeats the objection. Since 'There is not a plurality of worlds' is a possible-worlds sentence, this approach prescribes that 'Possibly, there is not a plurality of worlds' should be translated using P, not MF. So the fictionalist no longer asserts the instance of MF that is the final premiss of the argument mentioned in the objection. Replacing this premiss with the relevant instance of P yields the following argument:
